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ABORIGINAL TITLE CLAIMS IN THE INDIAN 
CLAIMS COMMISSION: UNITED STATES V. DANN 
AND ITS DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS 
Caroline L. Orlando* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Six hundred years ago the Indians of North America were the 
sole possessors of the United States' current land mass. 1 Today, they 
possess less than two percent of that land. 2 The United States gov-
ernment acquired much of the land from the Indians by treaties, 
which the government did not always keep; by purchases, for which 
the government did not always pay; or by force. 3 Federal policy 
toward this displacement fluctuated until 1946, when Congress en-
acted the Indian Claims Commission Act of 19464 (the Act), and 
thereby created the Indian Claims Commission (the ICC) to right 
all wrongs, legal and moral, which the United States government 
had committed against the Indians. 5 
Most claims brought before the ICC, which was authorized to 
award money judgments to tribal descendants whose land had been 
confiscated, 6 were based in the doctrine of aboriginal, or Indian, 
title. Aboriginal title describes the possessory rights of American 
Indians to lands they have occupied since time immemorial. 7 Occu-
* Citations and Articles Editor, 1985-1986, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
LAW REVIEW. 
1 Barsh, Indian Land Claims Policy in the United States, 58 N.D.L. REV. 7, 8 (1982). 
2Id. 
a See generally F.P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984), for a comprehensive history of the relations between 
the United States government and the Indians. 
4 Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, §§ 1-28, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3 (1976) (repealed 1978)). 
5 Barsh, supra note 1, at II. 
6 See Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v-3 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
7 Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 680 F.2d 122, 128 (Ct. Cl. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982). 
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pancy under the doctrine is determined with reference to Indian 
habits and modes of life; thus aboriginal title vests in the tribal group 
in its entirety.8 Many tribes or bands, however, are now divided or 
defunct, so tribal descendants who brought claims before the ICC 
may not have had a formal tribal structure in which to resolve 
conflicts among themselves. 9 Instead, disagreements about whether 
tribal descendants still hold aboriginal title to a particular parcel of 
land often arose only after proceedings before the I CC were begun. 
The ICC was dissolved in 1978,10 but its actions are the focus of 
continuing controversy regarding aboriginal title. The ICC often 
granted compensation for lands to which some tribal descendants 
might still have had valid aboriginal title. 11 This occurred because 
many tribal descendants filed claims for lands to which the United 
States had never formally obtained title. 12 In such claims, the attor-
neys for the tribal descendants, and for the government, stipulated 
to dates of extinguishment, in order to determine a money value for 
the land. 13 The ICC then awarded compensation, even though ab-
original title was never actually extinguished. 14 
The Act provides that determination of a claim by the ICC, and 
payment of the judgment, forever discharges the United States 
government, and bars any other claims on the matter at issue. 15 ICC 
judgments therefore may have the unexpected effect of extinguish-
ing aboriginal title. 16 Indians who contended that their title had been 
extinguished would file claims before the ICC; those who disputed 
that contention, usually because they still occupied the supposedly 
confiscated lands, had no reason to file a claim but were later barred 
from intervening in the claimants' actions before the ICC.17 The 
8 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 745 (1835). See infra notes 25-83 and 
accompanying text. 
9 Note, however, that a "majority of Indians in this country continue to be tribal members, 
regardless of where they live and regardless of whether or not their tribe is recognized by 
the Federal government .... " American Indian Policy Review Comm., FINAL REPORT, vol. 
I, at 434 (Comm. Print 1977). 
10 UNITED STATES INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as FINAL REPORT]. 
11 See, e.g., Temoak Band of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 593 F.2d 994, ceri. 
denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979). 
12 See, e.g., Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 11 I.C.C. 87 (1962). 
13 See, e.g., Temoak Band, 593 F.2d at 996. 
141d. 
15 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976). 
16 Claimants seeking compensation for aboriginal title land before the ICC did not have to 
assert extinguishment. Alternative claims could have been asserted - for example, for 
restricted use and enjoyment of aboriginal lands. 
17 See infra notes 174-215 and accompanying text. 
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tribal foundation of aboriginal title resulted in the ICC's inability to 
accommodate individual Indians with differing contentions respect-
ing aboriginal lands. Thus, it was often claimed that decisions by the 
ICC violated the procedural due process rights of Indians who con-
tended, in conflict with their fellow Indians, that the federal govern-
ment had not extinguished their aboriginal title. 18 
In United States v. Dann,19 the United States Supreme Court 
recently addressed the issue which may determine the ultimate ef-
fectiveness of many of the ICC's judgments. The Dann case is the 
most recent of a series of actions brought by Indians who claim that 
their aboriginal title was not lawfully extinguished, and that they 
were not represented before the ICC.20 In practical terms, the Court 
determined in Dann that a judgment by the ICC can extinguish 
aboriginal title,21 although in Dann22 the Court did not address the 
constitutional issue of whether failed intervenors before the ICC had 
a protectable right of due process. 
This article addresses the issues associated with the ICC's at-
tempts to resolve aboriginal title claims, and concludes that the 
ICC's consideration of aboriginal title claims often violated the right 
to due process of would-be intervenors. The first section introduces 
the doctrine of aboriginal title, which, since its inception in the 
American common law, established overlapping and sometimes con-
tradictory property rights in native Americans and the United States 
government. The second section discusses the legislative history 
behind the Indian Claims Commission Act, the claims brought before 
the ICC, and the positions of the parties bringing those claims. The 
third section examines the procedural history and outcome of the 
Dann case, in order to illustrate the inadequacies of the doctrine of 
aboriginal title. In conclusion, the article considers alternative ave-
nues of relief for Indian groups whose aboriginal title was declared 
extinguished by the ICC. As one commentator noted, "[t]he time 
has passed when it would have been possible to create a Commission 
18 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 29-33, United States v. Dann, 53 U.S.L.W. 4169 (U.S. 
Feb. 20, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Dannsl. 
19 53 U.S.L.W. 4169 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1985). 
20 See, e.g., Six Nations Confederacy v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cen. denied, 
447 U.S. 922 (1980). 
21 53 U.S.L.W. 4169 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1985); see also United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919, 
923 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Dann II]. Legally, the issue is whether members of a tribal 
descendant group may assert unextinguished aboriginal title as a defense in collateral litigation 
when the ICC has granted a judgment for extinguishment of that title to claimants repre-
senting the descendant group. See infra notes 216-90 and accompanying text. 
2253 U.S.L.W. 4169 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1985); see infra notes 291--322 and accompanying text. 
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most appropriate to its purpose,"23 but it is not too late to seek to 
rectify further injustices by the ICC. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE 
The legal doctrine of aboriginal title has developed in every Anglo-
European culture that conquered lands inhabited by people viewed 
as primitive and culturally disadvantaged. 24 The legal centerpiece of 
the doctrine is that the conquered people maintain merely the right 
to occupy their own land once the conquering nations have "discov-
ered" it. This notion developed from the conquerors' prevailing belief 
in Anglo-European superiority and manifest destiny. Another of the 
doctrine's principles is that aboriginal title vests in the entire tribe 
so that the individual has no rights outside of the tribal group. This 
notion originated in the collective character of many conquered peo-
ples' culture. This section will discuss the common law development 
of aboriginal title doctrine, to conclude that aboriginal title is an 
outmoded theory which has no rational basis in present-day Indian 
land claims. 
A. Common Law of Aboriginal Title 
The doctrine of aboriginal title was first enunciated in 1823, in the 
Supreme Court's landmark decision, Johnson v. M'Intosh. 25 In this 
case, the plaintiff sued to eject the defendant from land in Illinois 
which plaintiff had purchased from the Piakeshaw Indians. 26 The 
federal government, however, had granted the same land to the 
defendant's predecessor-in-interest.27 The issue before the Court was 
whether plaintiff's title, derived by a purchase from the Indians, 
was legally enforceable. 28 
The Court in J ohnson29 held that a private land sale, by an Indian 
to a nongovernmental party, to which the government had not con-
sented, gave the purchaser no valid title against the government's 
claim. The federal government alone had the right to extinguish 
23 Note, Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Claims Commission, 49 N.D.L. REV. 359, 
380 (1975). 
24 Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. 
L. REV. 195, 209 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Federal Power]. 
205 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 I d. at 572. 
29 Id. at 604-05. 
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Indian title; Indians had no independent power to sell or to convey 
their lands without the government's approval. 30 Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Marshall set forth the doctrine of discovery, 
and reasoned that sovereign nations obtained "ultimate title" by 
discovering land inhabited by non-Europeans. 31 This sovereign title 
gave the United States government, as the discovering nations' 
successor, an exclusive right to extinguish Indian title by purchase 
or conquest. In contrast, the Indians retained a legal claim merely 
to possess the land. 32 Based on these principles, Marshall concluded 
that until the United States exercised its right to confiscate, both 
the Indians and the government held simultaneous rights in the 
territory. After extinguishing aboriginal title, however, the govern-
ment obtained "absolute title," unencumbered by any Indian prop-
erty rights. 33 
To the extent that it effectively split the title to land possessed 
by the Indians into two distinct bundles of rights, the Johnson 
decision provided a sensible compromise. 34 However, this compro-
mise has uncertain implications. In theory, the "doctrine of discov-
ery" leaves title vested in the Indians, and merely grants to the 
government a preemptive right to purchase or take by conquest. 35 
Practically, however, the Johnson36 opinion denies recognition of 
Indian title by denying Indians the right to transfer their title 
through sale or conveyance without governmental participation. Or-
dinarily, such a disabling restraint on alienation of real property 
ownership would be unconstitutional. 37 Despite the resulting re-
straint on alienation, subsequent decisions involving aboriginal title38 
follow Johnson's practical result, and characterize the government's 
interest as full title ownership,39 and the Indians' interest as mere 
possession. 40 
30Id. at 585. 
31 I d. at 591. 
32 Id. at 603. 
33 I d. at 592. 
34 See Federal Power, supra note 24, at 208 n.69. 
35 The federal government's preemptive right means that Indians have a perpetual right to 
use and occupy aboriginal title lands "virtually equivalent to a fee interest against all but the 
United States." F. COHEN, FEDERAL HANDBOOK OF INDIAN LAW 489 (1982 ed.). 
36 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. 
37 See, e.g., Blackstone Bank v. Davis, 38 Mass. 42 (1838). 
38 Sac and Fox Tribe v. United States, 383 F.2d 991 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Oneida Indian Nation 
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 
U.S. 40 (1946). 
39 See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation, 414 U.S. at 667 ("[AJlthough fee title to the lands occupied 
by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign - first the discovering 
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The federal government may extinguish Indian title rights only 
by a clear and specific act of CongressY In United States ex rel. 
Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad,42 the Court concluded 
that a series of congressional and executive actions that treated 
Indian lands as public lands43 did not divest Indians of their aborig-
inal title since none of the actions evinced a "clear and plain indica-
tion" that Congress intended to extinguish the Hualpai's title. 44 The 
Court indicated, however, that once Congress has evinced a positive 
intent to do so, Congress is free to determine the manner, method, 
and time of such extinguishment without judicial interference. 45 The 
Court in Santa Fe listed the ways by which Congress could extin-
guish aboriginal title: "by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the 
exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or 
otherwise .... "46 Absent such an action indicating clear congres-
sional intent to extinguish, however, the Court concluded that the 
government's duty toward "its Indian wards" precludes implied ex-
tinguishment. 47 
Although Congress may extinguish aboriginal title by evincing a 
specific intent to do so, there is no right to compensation under the 
taking clause of the fifth amendment unless Congress has recognized 
the title. 48 The takings clause of the fifth amendment provides, "nor 
shall any private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation."49 However, in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United 
States,50 the Court held that mere aboriginal title, which Congress 
has not recognized, is not "property" within the meaning of the fifth 
European nation and later the original States and the United States - a right of occupancy 
in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. ") 
40 See, e.g., Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 745 (1835). 
41 F. COHEN, supra note 35, at 490. 
42 314 U.S. 339 (1941). 
43 Congress had granted Indian lands to "certain qualified citizens," one of which was the 
railroad's predecessor-in-interest. [d. at 348. See F. COHEN, supra note 35, at 210 ("Indian 
property ... is more properly classified as private property, subject to broad congressional 
control and special fiduciary obligations, rather than as public lands or other federal territory 
or property."). 
44 314 U.S. at 353. 
45 [d. at 347. 
46 [d. 
47 [d. at 353-54 ("Extinguishment cannot be lightly implied in view of the avowed solicitude 
of the Federal Government for the welfare of its Indian wards."). 
48 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-91 (1955). For a well-reasoned 
argument for overruling Tee-Bit-Ton, see Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal 
Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Whim]. 
49 U.S. CONST. amend V. 
50 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
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amendment. Therefore, the Court concluded, such property may be 
taken by the government without compensation. 51 
In Tee-Hit-Ton,52 a band of Tlingit Indians sought compensation 
under the fifth amendment for the government's confiscation of lum-
ber from aboriginal title lands in Alaska. The Court rejected the 
claim on the grounds that Congress had not recognized, by treaty 
or other unambiguous legislation, the tribe's right to live perma-
nently on the land. 53 Aboriginal title was determined to grant per-
mission from the government to possess the land, but not to own 
it. 54 Congress may choose to recognize Indians' permanent right to 
occupy a territory, but until the Indians obtain such recognized title, 
the government does not violate the fifth amendment when it takes 
their lands without paying compensation. 55 
As it developed in these and other Supreme Court cases,56 the 
doctrine of aboriginal title asserts, and simultaneously denies, In-
dians' title rights to lands that they have continuously occupied. 
Although courts have held that aboriginal title is as sacred as the 
fee simple,57 it is not a constitutionally protected property right. 58 
Even though Indians have an absolute present right to possess 
aboriginal land, the federal government may legitimately extinguish 
that right by force as well as by purchase. 59 In sum, aboriginal title 
grants Indians less than its name suggests. The government effec-
tively holds fee simple title, while the Indians hold a revocable right 
of occupancy. 
However characterized, aboriginal title vests in the tribe itself;60 
it is not divisible into title rights for individuals who move away 
from tribal lands and forfeit tribal membership.61 In Eastern Band 
51 I d. at 284-85. To determine whether a taking has occurred in all other types of property, 
a federal court must determine "when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain dispropor-
tionately concentrated in a few persons." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978). 
52 348 U.S. at 273. 
53 348 U.S. at 288-89. 
54 Id. at 279. 
551d. at 285. 
56 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581 (1832). See generally Cohen, 
Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28 (1947); Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights 
in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 637 (1978). 
57 Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 345 (citing Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 
(1835». 
58 Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 284-85. 
59 M'Intosh v. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589. 
60 F. COHEN, supra note 35, at 605. 
611d. at 607. 
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of Cherokee Indians v. United States,62 the Court applied this prin-
ciple to deny the claim of a group of Cherokees who had abandoned 
their tribal membership, yet who sought a share of the proceeds 
from the sale of tribal lands. 63 Since the tribe holds property for the 
common benefit of all tribal members, individual Indians were not 
permitted to possess a separable interest in such property.64 Indi-
viduals have the right to use and share in tribal property.65 That 
right, however, is conditioned upon tribal membership, governed by 
the applicable tribal laws, and revocable at the will of the tribe. 66 
Thus, the Court in Eastern Band67 held that the claimants forfeited 
their rights in tribal property by abandoning their tribal member-
ship. 
This is not the rule for individual Indians who are unaffiliated with 
any tribe. They may possess a recognizable claim of Indian title to 
a homestead, or the parcel of land that they continuously occupied. 68 
For example, in Cramer v. United States,69 three individual Indians 
claimed a right of occupancy in a parcel of land which the Central 
Pacific Rail Road Company had claimed under a federal land grant 
statute. 70 The government brought suit on behalf of the Indians,71 
claiming that the Indians' land was excluded from the grant to the 
railroad by a clause in the statute exempting land that had been 
"reserved . . . or otherwise disposed of. "72 The Court held that the 
grant to the railroad did not include title to the parcel held by the 
three Indians. 73 The Court reasoned that respect for tribal aboriginal 
title is extended to individual Indians' occupancy claims because of 
the federal government's "well understood policy ... of inducing 
62 117 U.S. 288 (1886). 
63 [d. at 308. 
64 [d. at 309. 
65 [d. at 308. 
66 [d. at 308-09. 
67 [d. at 31lo 
68 F. COHEN, supra note 35. 
69 261 U.S. 219 (1923). 
70 [d. at 224-25. Most federal land grant statutes conveyed federal lands by means of patents 
(the governmental equivalents of deeds), issued pursuant to general laws. III AM. LAW OF 
PROP. § 12.20, at 231-32 (1952). However, even a grant by the United States government is 
entirely ineffective as to land to which the government does not hold title. [d. at 235. 
71 The Court determined, as a threshold matter, that the government had the right to sue 
as guardian of its Indian wards in order to effectuate Congress' policy of protecting Indian 
title which had not yet been explicitly extinguished. 261 U.S. at 232-33. 
72 [d. at 227. The three individual Indians' right of occupancy in Cramer is analogous to 
tribal aboriginal title, because it was not explicitly protected by any statute or treaty. See 
Aguilar v. United States, 474 F. Supp. 840, 844 (1979). 
73 261 U.S. at 227. 
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the Indian to fore sake his wandering habits and adopt those of 
civilized life. "74 
B . Modern Problems with Aboriginal Title 
Because Indian tribal structure has changed so radically since 
aboriginal title first developed as a legal doctrine, the common law's 
continued application complicates present-day Indian land claims. 
Since title vests in the tribe as a group, tribal descendants collec-
tively possess aboriginal title, regardless of whether the tribe still 
exists as a political, social, or economic entity.75 Many tribes are now 
defunct or so divided that no coherent tribal organization exists. 
Thus, the principle that aboriginal title vests in the tribe has no 
clear legal meaning. 76 In addition, vesting title in the tribe presents 
three specific complications. First, Indian bands who have lived on 
a parcel of land for generations, without tribal or governmental 
interference, may consider such lands their own, despite the legal 
technicality that they lack fee simple title. 77 Second, without a formal 
tribal structure, such Indians have no organization from which to 
derive their continuing legal rights to use or to occupy the land. 78 
Third, Indian bands or groups may disagree about which entity has 
aboriginal title rights to particular parcels of land. Without cohesive 
tribal organizations, no Indian forum exists where such disputes are 
resolved. 79 In short, individual Indians, unaffiliated with any tribe, 
may possess parcels of land, but they have no tribal organizations 
from which to derive aboriginal title, and no forum within which to 
resolve disputes. 
74 [d. However, the Court's reasoning in Cramer, that individual Indians have a legally 
enforceable right to occupancy in addition to tribal aboriginal title, has not been applied in 
subsequent decisions. See E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 117 U.S. 288 (1886); 
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). 
75 See Eastern Band, 117 U.S. at 308-09. 
76 See, e.g., Osceola v. Kuykendall, 4 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PRO-
GRAM) F-80 (Mar. 11, 1977). Of course, many Indian tribes do still exist, and exercise powers 
of self-government. Indian tribes are distinct, independent political communities, and still 
have rights of local self-government to regulate internal and social relations. See, e.g., Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
77 See, e.g., United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Dann 
1]. 
78 Claims by individual Indians were beyond the jurisdictional scope of the ICC. See 25 
U.S.C. § 70a (1976) (authorizing "claims against the United States on behalf of any Indian 
tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians .... "). See also Delaware Tribal 
Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (ICC is not empowered to hear individual 
claims). 
79 See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923). 
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In addition to these complications, in 1871 Congress withdrew 
recognition of Indian tribes as independent nations with which the 
United States may contract by treaty.80 In 1924, Congress granted 
United States citizenship to all Indians.81 Thus, Indian tribes are no 
longer politically or legally autonomous, but individual Indians pos-
sess the constitutionally protected rights of all American citizens. 
The doctrine of aboriginal title, however, did not accommodate 
any of these fundamental changes. Furthermore, when it created 
the ICC, Congress did not address the legal quagmire of aboriginal 
title doctrine. It merely created a forum to resolve claims by Indians 
against the federal government.82 Unfortunately, the majority of 
such claims are based on issues of aboriginal title.83 The ICC merely 
inherited, in toto, an outmoded and unclear common law framework 
for ascertaining the existence, or the extinguishment, of aboriginal 
title. 
III. THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 
Despite its limitations, the ICC became the primary legal forum 
in which Indians could bring suit against the federal government. 
The legislative history of the Indian Claims Commission Act indi-
cates that Congress intended the ICC to serve several purposes: to 
remedy the denial of due process that occurred when Indians were 
denied a forum in which to sue the federal government;84 to resolve 
the financial and administrative problem resulting from Indian de-
pendence on federal assistance;85 and to settle all Indian grievances 
with finality.86 The ICC did provide a viable legal forum for Indian 
groups, but it denied individual Indian citizens any opportunity to 
present individual claims or protect individual rights. 87 Furthermore, 
the ICC's group representation standard for claimants,88 and its 
reluctance to permit intervention by other interested Indian 
groups,89 so severely restricted the ICC's effectiveness that it failed 
80 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § I, 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1983)). 
81 Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(I) (1983)). 
82 See infra notes 84-136 and accompanying text. 
83 Pierce, The Work of the Indian Claims Commission, 63 A.B.A. J. 227,229 (1977). 
84 See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1945), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG'L SERVo 1347, 1348. 
85 See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. 
86 See infra notes 132--36 and accompanying text. 
87 See infra notes 137-215 and accompanying text 
88 See infra notes 137-81 and accompanying text. 
89 See infra notes 159-76 and accompanying text. 
1986] INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 251 
to develop into an effective forum to settle definitively Indian 
claims. 90 
A. Legislative History 
Before the ICC was formed in 1946, Indians were barred from 
suing the federal government directly by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.91 Congress attempted to resolve this problem by enacting 
special jurisdictional statutes that waived sovereign immunity and 
granted jurisdiction to the Court of Claims. 92 However, Indians could 
not bring their claims to the Court of Claims because a provision 
passed in 1863 expressly removed from the court's jurisdiction all 
claims arising out of treaties with Indian tribes. 93 In response to 
Indian petitions, Congress enacted more than one hundred special 
jurisdictional statutes that granted the Court of Claims jurisdiction 
over specified claims. 94 Both Congress and the Indian community 
grew dissatisfied with this time-consuming, costly, and often unfair 
process,95 so they introduced a number of bills designed to settle all 
Indian grievances fairly and efficiently. 96 
The Indian Claims Commission Act of 194697 was one s'uch bill. It 
created a commission with authority to hear and finally determine 
all Indian claims against the federal government that accrued before 
August 13, 1946.98 Congress authorized the ICC to adopt its own 
90 See infra notes 177-215 and accompanying text. 
91 See, e.g., Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 488 (1925) (sovereign immunity barred suit 
raising due process claim against Secretary of the Interior arising out of cession of timber 
lands in trust). 
92 F. COHEN, supra note 35, at 563. The Court of Claims was succeeded by the Claims 
Court in October, 1982. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, Apr. 
2, 1982,96 Stat. 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1982)). 
93 The Court of Claims Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (recodified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982)). This Act was passed because some large, well-known 
Indian tribes had owned slaves and supported the Confederacy in the Civil War. Pierce, supra 
note 83, at 227. When Indians obtained citizenship status in 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1924), 
this prohibition became a serious violation of Indians' constitutional rights of due process. See 
infra at notes 291-322 and accompanying text. The prohibition remained in effect until 1949. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 259 (1940). 
94 Barsh, supra note 1, at 10. 
95 Otoe and Missouria Tribe v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265, 272 (Ct. Cl. 1955) cert. 
denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955). 
96 For a list of bills proposed, see id. at 272-73, nn. 11-12. For a detailed comparison of the 
enacted version of the Act with a proposed version of 1935, which effectively illustrates the 
evolution of the form and function of the ICC, see Note, supra note 23, at 367-70. 
9'725 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v-3 (1976). 
98 Id. at § 70. Jurisdiction of claims accruing after that date is granted to the Court of 
Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976). 
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rules of procedure and provided a framework for fair, efficient and 
final determination of Indian claims.99 According to the terms of the 
Act, during the first five years of the ICC's ten-year existence, 100 
any Indian tribe, band, or identifiable group101 was permitted to 
present claims. 102 When the Secretary of the Interior determined 
that one tribal organization was authorized to represent a group, 
that organization was recognized as having an exclusive privilege to 
represent that group before the ICC.103 Both the government and 
the Indian claimants could appeal an ICC decision to the Court of 
Claims, and subsequently to the Supreme Court.104 The ICC itself 
was authorized to certify to the Court of Claims any questions of 
law. 105 The Act provided that any attorney hired to represent a 
claimant group before the ICC must be hired according to the sta-
tutory provisions governing all contracts with Indian groups. 106 
These provisions required that to create a valid contract with an 
Indian group, the contract terms must be approved by both the 
Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 107 
In addition, Congress authorized the ICC to set the fees payable to 
an attorney representing a claim before the ICC.lOS 
The Act listed five broad classes of claims that could be brought 
before the ICC.109 This article discusses the three such classes that 
encompass land claims: claims based on the Constitution;110 claims 
involving treaties;1l1 and claims that land owned or occupied by 
99 25 U.S.C. § 70h (1976). 
100Id. at § 70a. Sixty-two percent of all claims before the ICC were filed in the last six 
weeks of the five-year period. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Dept. of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1960 of the House C omm. on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1079 (1952). Because the 370 claims filed could not be completely resolved within 
the ten-year statutory time limit, Congress amended the Act four times to extend the life of 
the ICC. The final amendment called for the ICC to complete its work by the end of fiscal 
year 1978. 25 U.S.C. § 70v (1976). The ICC transferred its unfinished dockets to the Court 
of Claims. FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 20. 
101 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976). 
102Id. at § 70i. 
103 [d. 
104 Id. at § 70s(b)-(c). The decisions published by the ICC are not readily available, nor 
conveniently indexed. Thus, appellate decisions by the Court of Claims and the Supreme 
Court provide the most accessible, though limited, view of the ICC's proceedings. 
105 25 U.S.C. § 70s (a) (1976). 
106 [d. at § 70n (1976). 
107Id. at § 81. 
108 Id. at § 70n. The fee was not to exceed ten percent of the ICC's award. Id. 
109 Whim, supra note 48, at 1256. 
110 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976). 
III Id. 
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Indians had been confiscated without the payment of agreed upon 
compensation. 112 According to the language of the Act, these claims 
could sound in either law or equity.113 Thus, the Act seemed to 
empower the ICC to grant equitable compensation, in the form of 
fee simple title to the land in question. 
Despite this implicit recognition of equitable claims, the wording 
of the Act also implied that Congress intended to limit the remedy 
available to monetary compensation. 114 One section of the Act, for 
example, provided that "[t]he final determination of the Commission 
... shall include ... a statement [of] whether there are any just 
grounds for relief and, if so, the amount thereof .... "115 Another 
section provided that "there is hereby authorized to be appropriated 
such sums as are necessary to pay the final determination of the 
Commission."116 The ICC and the Court of Claims interpreted this 
112Id. 
113Id. 
114 Note, supra note 23, at 390. Congress' creation of the ICC to hear Indian claims against 
the government had the anomalous result of establishing a quasi-judicial proceeding in which 
equitable claims could be heard but no equitable remedy could be granted. The Indian Claims 
Commission Act made possible equitable and moral claims otherwise not permitted under the 
common law that had developed in the era of special jurisdictional acts, see supra note 94 and 
accompanying text, but it implicitly limited the remedy available to Indian claimants to money 
judgments. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text. Since the Act's language was 
general, its interpretation was left to the discretion of the ICC and the courts. The Act's 
language did not, however, appear to leave any opportunity for the ICC to settle title disputes. 
In Otoe & Missouria Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265 (Ct. Cl. 1955), 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955), the Court of Claims rejected an interpretation of the Act 
which would have precluded claims based on aboriginal title that had not been "recognized" 
by Congress in the sense described in Tee-Hit-Ton. 131 F. Supp. at 285; see supra notes 48-
55 and accompanying text. Had the court accepted the government's interpretation of the 
Act, many tribes would have been prevented from recovering for either unjust land transac-
tions, or for outright confiscations of their aboriginal land. Whim, supra note 48, at 1256. 
Instead, the court unanimously concluded that claimants asserting extinguished aboriginal 
title before the ICC could recover the land's fair market value at the time of confiscation. 131 
F. Supp. at 290-91. Otoe thus mitigated the potentially preclusive effect of the Tee-Hit-Ton 
decision on aboriginal claims before the ICC. Whim, supra note 48, at 1257. In addition, the 
court in Otoe reviewed extensively the congressional intent of the Act, and held that the ICC 
possessed broad authority to hear all outstanding Indian claims against the government, 
regardless of whether they were legal, equitable, or moral. 131 F. Supp. at 275. See 25 U.S.C. 
§ 70a (1976). Indian individuals as well as groups may bring claims accruing after August 13, 
1946 before the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976). 
While the Court of Claims interpreted the Act broadly to allow the ICC to hear equitable 
and moral claims (otherwise not permitted under the common law that had developed in the 
era of special jurisdictional acts), neither the ICC nor the Court of Claims ever addressed the 
issue of whether any remedy other than monetary compensation was available under the Act. 
The silence of both the Act and the courts indicates that the ICC was not intended to decide 
title disputes. 
115 25 U.S.C. § 70r (1976) (emphasis added). 
116Id. at § 70u (emphasis added). 
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language to limit relief to monetary compensation. ll7 The Act's fail-
ure to address the possibility of granting title as compensation in-
dicated that Congress did not intend the ICC to settle title dis-
putes. U8 
Instead, Congress intended the Act to accomplish three goals. 
First, the Act was to eliminate the injustice of denying Indians the 
opportunity to bring suits directly before the Court of Claims. U9 The 
report of the House Committee on Indian Affairs120 that recom-
mended passage of the Act stated that the Act was designed 
not only to grant the Indian his long-delay[ed] day in court, but 
also to set up an impartial fact-finding commission which [would] 
facilitate the judicial solution of disputed cases, and report di-
rectly to the Congress on those cases where the law is undisputed 
and the facts are clear. 121 
Although the Act did not provide for the ICC to hear valid claims 
by individual Indians, the Act was considered a sufficient forum for 
all Indian suits because Indian claims were assumed to be tribal and 
not individual. 122 
Second, Congress provided a forum for Indian claims to encourage 
Indians to sever their tribal ties and to become assimilated into 
American society. 123 Until all land claims were settled, the committee 
report claimed, Indians were "impelled to cling to tribal associa-
tions,"124 in order to maintain their right to any forthcoming settle-
ment from the government. 125 The Act would effectively diminish 
federal expenditures for Indians, because Congress intended the 
ICC's judgment funds to lessen Indian dependence on other federal 
assistance. 126 The committee report stated: 
117 See, e.g., Osage Nation v. United States, 1 I.C.C. 54, 65-66 (1948), rev'd on other 
grounds, 119 Ct. Cl. 592 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951) ("The Indian Claims 
Commission Act does not specifically state the character of relief the Commission may grant, 
but this lack of specificity is not vital, for its provisions plainly limit the relief to that which 
is compensable in money .... No other kind of relief is provided for in the act."). 
118 [d. Settling a title dispute, however, is in effect what the ICC did in the Dann case. See 
infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
119 H.R. REP. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG'L 
SERVo 1347, 1348 [hereinafter cited as House Committee on Indian Affairs]. 
120 [d. at 1349. 
121 [d. at 1348. 
122 [d. at 1349 ("Once Indian tribes are given the same right as any non-Indian to bring suit 
on grievances that may arise in the future, there would be no need to accord any special 
treatment to such Indian claims as may subsequently arise." (emphasis added)). 
123 [d. at 1351. 
124 [d. See supm notes 60-67 and accompanying text. 
125 [d. 
126 [d. at 1354. 
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[i]f the result of the proposed adjudication of existing claims will 
be, as your committee confidently expects, to permit a reduction 
of at least 50 percent in Federal expenditures on Indians during 
the next 50 years, tM total ultimate saving in such expenditures 
would be in the neighborhood of $750,000,000, a sum many times 
the most optimistic estimate made by the Indians of probable 
recoveries on all existing claims. 127 
If the estimates proved true,128 the ICC would benefit all concerned 
- government as well as Indians. 
Third, Congress intended the ICC to accomodate all Indian claims 
with finality, so that Congress could be rid of cumbersome Indian 
claims forever. The process of passing special jurisdictional acts 
"impose[d] a vast and growing burden upon the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of the Government. "129 Special jurisdictional acts 
took time and resources to secure. 130 Claims presented in the pro-
posed jurisdictional acts may have been incomplete or subsequently 
changed, thereby requiring some amendment to the original juris-
dictional act, or additional legislation.131 Although the committee 
report initially stated the Act's primary purpose was "to grant the 
Indian his long-delay[ed] day in court,"132 the report later stated that 
the "chief purpose" of the Act was "to dispose of the Indian claims 
problem with finality. "133 The report referred to the explicit listing 
of all classes of cases,134 and the treatment of an ICC decision as a 
final judgment of the Court of Claims,135 as provisions intended to 
provide finality.136 Although Congress clearly articulated its three 
goals of providing a fair forum for Indian grievances, reducing fed-
eral assistance to Indians, and settling all pendent claims, Congress . 
did not indicate which goal had priority over the others. Instead, 
Congress left the task of establishing the relative weight of its three 
goals to the ICC and the Court of Claims. 
127 [d. 
128 One commentator notes the inaccuracy of the committee report's analysis: 
Ideally, claims payments would give Indian people the necessary stake to begin a 
new life as ordinary citizens far from the reservations. In actual fact, the amounts 
paid were relatively small on a per capita basis and Indian communities persisted. 
Laurie, Historical Background, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN TODAY 81 (L. Stuart & N. Lurie 
ed. 1968). 
129 House Committee on Indian Affairs, supra note 119, at 1352. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. at 1352-53. 
132 [d. at 1348. 
133 [d. at 1356. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. at 1358. 
136 [d. at 1356, 1358. 
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B. Representation before the Indian Claims Commission 
As a result of the ICC's internal procedures, the congressional 
goals of reducing the federal burden of both Indian dependency and 
numerous pending claims were satisfied, but the less explicitly ar-
ticulated congressional goal of providing Indians with a forum to 
protect their constitutional rights was not. However, while it did 
provide an adequate forum for Indian groups, the ICC failed to 
provide a similar forum for individual Indians. 
Congress in the Indian Claims Commission Act137 granted the ICC 
authority to establish its own rules of procedure, but specified that 
potential claimants could only represent group claims: 
[a]ny claim within the provisions of this Act may be presented 
to the Commission by any member of an Indian tribe, band, or 
other identifiable group of Indians as the representative of all 
its members; but wherever any tribal organization exists, rec-
ognized by the Secretary of the Interior as having authority to 
represent such tribe, band, or group, such organization shall be 
accorded the exclusive privilege of representing such Indians, 
unless fraud, collusion, or laches on the part of such organization 
be shown to the satisfaction of the Commission. 138 
The ICC's regulations regarding recognized successors-in-interest139 
closely echoed this language. These regulations authorized three 
types of claimants: (1) a duly elected or appointed officer of a group 
that had been authorized by the Secretary of the Interior;140 (2) any 
member of such a group if the group's organization did not bring a 
claim because of fraud, collusion, or laches;141 and (3) any member 
of a group that was not formally authorized. 142 These categories of 
potential claimants were broadly framed, apparently to ensure that 
all viable Indian claims could be pursued. 
In its opinions construing the parameters of the ICC's represen-
tation standards,143 the Court of Claims allowed the broadly permis-
sive representation of claims. For example, in Thompson v. United 
States,144 the court held that claimants could bring suit on behalf of 
137 25 U.S.C. § 70h (1976). 
138 Id. at § 70i. 
139 25 C.F.R. § 503.1 (1978). 
14°Id. at § 503.1(b). 
141 Id. at § 503.1(e). 
142Id. at § 503.1(d). 
143 See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 348 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 
(1956); McGhee v. Creek Nation, 122 Ct. Cl. 380 (1952). 
144 122 Ct. Cl. 348 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952). 
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the "Indians of California," without identifying specific tribes or 
bands. The court reasoned that the inclusion of the phrase "or other 
identifiable groups" in the Act indicated congressional intent to 
broaden the category of Indian groups entitled to present claims 
against the government. 145 The court ruled that the Act permitted 
a single representative action on behalf of several groups where the 
claimants can be identified as members or descendants of members 
of tribes, bands, or communities existing when the claim arose. 146 
In Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 147 
the Court of Claims addressed the issue of whether the ICC properly 
had designated the ancestral land-owning group. Three distinct 
bands of the same ancestral group filed separate claims before the 
ICC.148 All three claims involved the same 10 million acre parcel of 
land in North Dakota, and each sought fair compensation for the 
extinguishment of the ancestral group's aboriginal title. 149 
In a consolidated proceeding, the ICC coined a name for the 
identifiable ancestral group, and ruled that the identifiable group 
had held aboriginal title to most of the land involved in the agree-
ment. 150 One of the five issues raised on appeal was whether the ICC 
properly had designated the ancestral land-owning entity.151 Two of 
the three claimant bands asserted that the correct designation of the 
identifiable group was the name of their own band. 152 They claimed 
that the ICC's designation was either too broad, too recently coined, 
or too vague. 153 The Court of Claims agreed, and modified the ICC's 
designation into a definitional, 24-word title,154 accompanied by an 
145 I d. at 360. 
146Id. at 357. 
147 490 F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl. 1974). 
148 I d. at 938. 
149 Id. The court described the extinguishing transaction as follows: 
Id. 
After two unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a cession, Congress established the 
McCumber Commission to acquire this Pembina North Dakota region. This agency 
negotiated with the Chippewas until Little Shell, the hereditary chief, withdrew 
along with several others from the negotiations in protest. The local Indian agent 
selected a "Committee of 32" to represent the Indians, and the negotiations continued, 
concluding with a pact on October 22, 1892. After a long delay, Congress amended 
and approved the agreement on April 21, 1904, ... and the Indians approved [it] on 
February 15, 1905. 
150 I d. at 938, 939. 
151 Id. at 939. 
152Id. at 950-51. 
153Id. 
154 Id. at 952. The court designated the identifiable group as the "American Pembina Chip-
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apologetic explanation: "[t]his title, although somewhat ungainly, 
accomplishes the purpose of excluding those not in interest, and 
including all with colorable claims. "155 
The court's premise was that the ICC was to determine which 
identifiable group of Indians had been wronged. 156 Therefore the 
ICC should not have described the identifiable group "in such a way 
as to exclude any claimant with a colorable right, or to give a 'leg 
up' to anyone of several, possibly competing, entities all deriving 
[their claims] through the same ancestral groUp."157 At the same 
time, the court acknowledged that the ICC merely had the duty to 
denominate the wronged entity. Congress alone had the authority 
to decide such questions as which members may share in the judg-
ment award. 158 
The court's decisions in Thompson and Turtle Mountain Band 
illustrate their concern for designating the identifiable group broadly 
in order to include all claimants with a viable interest in the lands 
in question. Its holding in Thompson, that the loosely named "In-
dians of California" constituted an "identifiable group" under the 
Act, and its holding in Turtle Mountain Band, that the ICC's des-
ignation of the identifiable group should be as inclusive yet precise 
as possible, reinforced the broad sweep of the Act's phrase "identi-
fiable group." 
One of the ICC's noteworthy inadequacies is that neither its es-
tablishing Act159 nor its own rules of procedure160 contain any pro-
vision concerning standards for intervention by interested parties. 
This is surprising, in light of Congress' concern for full, fair, and 
final determination of all outstanding Indian claims. 161 In a report of 
the House Committee on Indian Affairs, for example, the Committee 
expressed its concern that the classes of claims to be heard by the 
ICC should "be broad enough to include all possible claims," to 
prevent further appeals for special jurisdictional acts. 162 Apparently, 
however, Congress did not foresee the similar potential for dispute 
pewa group (full and mixed bloods), including the subgroups of the Turtle Mountain Band, 
the Pembina Band, and the Little Shell Bands." Id. 
155Id. 
156 I d. at 951. 
157Id. at 951--52. 
158 I d. at 952--53. 
159 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v (1976). 
160 25 C.F.R. §§ 503.1-503.42 (1978). 
161 House Committee on Indian Affairs, supra note 119, at 1355. 
162 I d. at 1355-56. 
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resulting from a deficient intervention policy. Although decisions in 
the Court of Claims indicate that the standard for intervention 
should be as permissive as that for bringing a claim,163 the ICC itself 
limited parties' rights to intervene once a claim had been filed. 164 
For example, in McGhee v. Creek Nation,165 the Court of Claims 
held that any group identified as descendants of the tribe or band 
existing when the claim arose, met the statute's jurisdictional re-
quirements, and may intervene in an action brought by another 
group of descendants. 166 The claimants recognized by the ICC in 
McGhee represented that part of the Creek Nation which had emi-
grated west to Oklahoma to establish a new tribal government. The 
United States government formally recognized the new tribe. The 
attempted intervenors descended from a group which had remained 
east of the Mississippi, and had become United States citizens. 167 
The ICC denied their motion to intervene. 168 Because the intervenors 
did not constitute a tribe recognized by the United States, the ICC 
concluded that they were individuals with separate claims, and not 
a recognized tribe. Thus, the ICC determined that it lacked the 
authority to hear the claims. 169 Creek descendants who had brought 
the claim, on the other hand, represented the recognized Creek 
tribe. 170 
The Court of Claims reversed the ICC and granted the interven-
ors' motion. l7l The court reasoned that the disbanding of the tribe 
as it existed at the time the claim arose did not change the group 
163 See, e.g., McGhee v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 380, 391 (1952); see infra note 175 and 
accompanying text. 
164 See infra notes 178-215 and accompanying text. 
165 122 Ct. Cl. 380 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952). 
166 I d. at 391. 
167Id. at 385. The land cession which was the basis of the claim before the ICC was part of 
a treaty entered into in 1814, between the Creek Nation and the United States, whereby the 
Creek Nation ceded to the United States some 23,000,000 acres of their aboriginal title land 
without compensation. Id. at 383-84. The claimant group before the ICC contended that the 
Creeks entered this treaty under duress, and the United States had violated the standards 
of fair and honorable dealings developed by the Indian Claims Commission Act. Id. at 384 
n.6. See 25 U.S.C. § 70a(5) (1976). 
168 Id. at 382. The motion to intervene was filed in 1951, before the Act's deadline for filing 
new claims. Id. 
169 I d. at 391. 
170 Id. at 383. The ICC also concluded that it could not grant intervention because it did not 
have the authority; only Congress could identify the individual Indians eligible to recover on 
a claim. Id. 
171 I d. at 391. 
260 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:241 
character of the claim. 172 Thus, both an officially organized group of 
descendants and unorganized but identifiable group of descendants 
of the same ancestral entity may be separately represented before 
the ICC.173 
The court recognized the ICC's authority to allow all interested 
parties, consisting of an identifiable group of Indians, to intervene 
or become parties to the suit.174 The legislative purpose of complete 
and expeditious settlement of all Indian claims would be thwarted if 
the ICC denied intervention to descendants of the tribe which held 
the aboriginal title when the claim arose. 175 This conclusion, however, 
has not been interpreted to require the ICC to permit the interven-
tion of all contesting tribal descendants. 176 
The ICC's broad group representation standards were flawed be-
cause Congress, in its attempt to prevent claims from unrepresented 
Indians, failed to foresee the possibility of competing interests within 
ancestral groupS.177 Thus, the group representation standards as 
drafted created problems for unrepresented descendant subgroups 
or individuals when they attempted to intervene later in the ICC 
proceedings. These problems are best illustrated by the lawsuits 
involving the Seminoles and the Six Nations Confederacy. 
172Id. at 392. 
173Id. at 392. The court dismissed the ICC's reasoning that because only Congress had the 
authority to determine the individual Indians eligible to share in an ICC judgment, the ICC 
could not grant the petition to intervene. Id. at 386-88. The court reasoned that the petition 
to intervene did not require the ICC to make an ultra vires determination, but merely raised 
the issue of whether the petitioner had the exclusive right to prosecute the claim, or whether 
representatives of descendants of the entire Creek Nation were the proper claimants. Id. at 
395. 
174Id. at 394 (dicta). 
175 I d. at 395. 
176 Barsh, supra note 1, at 20. The intervenors in McGhee may be distinguished. They filed 
their motion to intervene in early 1951, months before the Act's deadline for filing claims. See 
supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
177 Indians filing claims before the ICC sought monetary compensation for their confiscated 
land; some Indians did not file claims, however, because they wanted to retain the land itself. 
The Act's legislative history indicates that Congress assumed the United States government 
had already paid some consideration for confiscated land involved in claims before the ICC. 
See, e.g., House Committee on Indian Affairs, supra note 119, at 1355 ("[A]bout 95 percent 
of the land that has been brought under the control of the Federal Government from 1776 to 
the present day has been acquired by open sale and agreement from the Indian tribes. It is 
only the exceptional, rather than the normal, case that presents the situation of land taken 
by the United States without compensation fixed by formal agreement."). Based on this 
assumption, Congress did not expect Indians to have legitimate claims for the land itself. 
Barsh, supra note 1, at 21. 
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1. The Seminole Nation 
Despite the court's decisions in M cGhee178 and Turtle Mountain, 179 
once the representative of an identifiable group is recognized, this 
claimant group is the exclusive representative of all tribal descen-
dants, even though not all of the competing interests are repre-
sented. This situation arises where Indians still occupy aboriginal 
land, and are therefore unlikely to file a claim with the ICC for lands 
to which they apparently still hold title. 180 Members who were dis-
placed by the government from a portion of the tribal land, however, 
had a moneta.ry incentive to include the entire ancestral parcel in 
their claim. Furthermore, Indians still living on aboriginal land may 
not have had notice that a separate descendant group claimed the 
extinguishment of aboriginal title. Then, when the Indians occupying 
aboriginal land attempted to intervene in the ICC proceedings, they 
were usually denied the right because the proceedings were at an 
advanced stage. 181 The Seminole Nation's claim is the earliest ex-
ample of such conflicting interests within a tribal group. 182 
The Seminole Nation in Florida is divided into "reservation" Sem-
inoles, and "traditional," or unaffiliated Seminoles, who continue to 
live on aboriginal land in the Everglades. 183 At the suggestion of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, a group of reservation Seminoles filed a 
claim for lands allegedly taken by the government. l84 This claim 
included the lands on which the traditional Seminoles continued to 
live. In 1954, the traditional Seminoles filed a motion to dismiss the 
reservation Seminoles' claim before the ICC.185 In a summary pro-
ceeding, the ICC denied the motion and struck it from the record. 186 
178 122 Ct. Cl. 380 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952). See supra notes 165-76 and 
accompanying text. 
179 490 F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl. 1974). See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text. 
180 This is particularly troublesome because of the widespread Indian custom of registering 
disapproval of a certain tribal course of action by refusing to participate. P. MA'ITHIESEN, IN 
THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE 27 (1983). 
181 See, e.g., statement of Robert Coulter, attorney for traditional Seminoles, in Distribution 
of Seminole Judgment Funds: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearingsl. 
182 See 1978 Hearings, supra note 181, at 61-127. 
183 Id. at 50. 
184 Billie v. United States, 146 F.Supp. 459, 459 (Ct. Cl. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 843 
(1957). 
185 146 F. Supp. at 460. Although the traditional Seminoles incorrectly filed a motion to 
quash, the court entertained the motion as a motion to dismiss. I d. 
186 Id. No reason was given for the denial. 1978 Hearings, supra note 181, at 61. 
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On appeal, the Court of Claims refused to review the ICC's decision 
because it did not constitute a final order.187 The court added, how-
ever, that 
[i]t seems to be appellant's position that although it is not and 
does not wish to be a party to the suit, its title to part of the 
land which is the subject matter of the suit is paramount, and 
that a decree of the Indian Claims Commission establishing the 
rights of the original parties to that subject matter (land) would 
work an injustice and irreparable injury on the appellant. If 
appellant's title to the land which is the subject matter of the 
suit is indeed paramount, his paramount title will not be affected 
by the decree of the Commission as to the rights of the original 
parties since it will not purport to adjudicate appellant's title or 
right to the land in question. 188 
After another unsuccessful attempt to intervene in the ICC pro-
ceedings,189 the traditional Seminoles contacted the Interior Depart-
ment, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, members of Congress, and 
members of the Eisenhower Administration. 190 In response to their 
plea, President Eisenhower assigned a special representative to 
meet with the traditional Seminoles. 191 
The ICC proceedings continued, however, without the traditional 
Seminoles' participation, and in 1976 the ICC approved a compromise 
settlement of $16 million. 192 Once the judgment was rendered, the 
government broke off negotiations with the traditional group. 193 The 
Justice Department contended that by including the traditional Sem-
inoles in a judgment, with or without the group's consent, the ICC 
settled all outstanding claims against the government. 194 It remains 
187 146 F. Supp. at 461. 
188 [d. The court then declared the issue not ripe for appeal. [d. 
189 1978 Hearings, supra note 181, at 60. 
190 [d. at 58. 
191 [d. at 98. 
192 [d. at 2. 
193 Barsh, supra note 1, at 20. 
194 1978 Hearings, supra note 181, at 58. Traditional Seminoles brought an action seeking 
an injunction to halt the distribution of the ICC's judgment in 1977. Osceola v. Kuykendall, 4 
INDIAN L. REP. F-80 CAM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) (Mar. 11, 1977). A district 
court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claim, holding that the ICC proceedings did 
not threaten the Indians' possessory interest: 
Entry of the judgment will create no new property rights in the United States, for 
the United States already holds fee simple title to the land, subject only to any rights 
of possession which plaintiffs and others like him may have. Similarly, plaintiff's 
right of possession and occupancy will not be affected by the judgment. 
[d. at F-82. The court observed that in the future, the traditional Seminoles might have to 
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unclear whether the claim of the traditional Seminoles is conclusively 
decided. 195 
2. Six Nations Confederacy 
The ICC's recognition of a given claimant as the representative of 
an identifiable group presents another obstacle to the equitable res-
olution of claims. Such a policy does not preclude suits by subgroups 
on behalf of larger groups which have organized governing bodies, 
and which have refused to approve or ratify claims. 196 Instead, the 
ICC regulations permitted any member of a formally organized 
group to bring a claim on behalf of the group, providing the claimant 
could prove that the group officers had refused to bring suit. 197 
Moreover, the ICC procedures do not require formal tribal repre-
sentatives to testify about the reason for their refusal to file a claim. 
The ICC relies instead on the claimant group's proof that its request 
to the tribal entity to bring suit has been refused. 198 The problems 
engendered by the ICC's permissive allowance of claims, without 
regard for conflict within the tribal organization, are illustrated by 
the Six Nations Confederacy claim. 
A group of Six Nations Indians filed a claim on behalf of the Six 
Nations in 1950,199 even though the Six Nations' official leadership 
had denied the claimants' attorneys the authority to represent the 
Confederacy before the ICC.200 In 1973 the ICC entered its final 
judgment. 201 The governing body of the Six Nations continued to 
assert that the claimants before the ICC were not authorized to 
represent the Six Nations. Rather than present his assertions to the 
ICC in its hearings on the disposition of the award, Chief Shenan-
doah contacted President Nixon and negotiated with the Department 
prove possession of Indian title and continuous use and occupancy of the land "to protect 
[their) rights against interference by the United States or third parties." Id. at F-83. 
The traditional Seminoles also attempted to amend the bill authorizing the distribution of 
the judgment funds, with a provision reserving their aboriginal title to land and forestalling 
any res judicata effect the judgment might have. They were unsuccessful here as well. 1978 
Hearings, supra note 181, at 56. 
195 The Dann decision provides precedent for the proposition that the Seminole claim can 
no longer be asserted. See infra notes 276-91 and accompanying text. 
196 Such a prohibition might have ensured fuller and fairer representation of the tribal group 
when differences within the· group existed. 
197 25 C.F.R. § 501(c) (1978). 
198Id. 
199 Six Nations Confederacy v. Andrus, 447 F. Supp. 40, 41 (D.D.C. 1977). 
2()() Id. at 42 n.5. 
201 Id. at 41. 
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of the Interior.202 Despite these negotiations, the Department of the 
Interior submitted to Congress a plan for distribution of the ICC's 
judgment.203 The plan became effective in 1977. 204 The Six Nations 
leadership sought redress in Six Nations Confederacy v. Andrus. 205 
They claimed that payment of the award would irreparably impair 
the leadership's rights under certain treaties, and that such an im-
pairment would be effected without due process. 206 The district court 
dismissed the Six Nations' claim because the ICC's judgment was 
final once reported to Congress, and could not be set aside. 207 The 
appellate court affirmed208 on the grounds that the tribal leadership 
had forfeited their only remedy by not intervening before the ICC.209 
The Six Nations Confederacy and Seminole examples illustrate 
that the ICC's narrow intervention standards foreclosed valid ab-
original title claims. This unanticipated effect occurred despite the 
ICC's broadly construed representation standards that were origi-
nally intended to allow fairer and fuller representation of Indian 
claims. In light of the breakdown of tribal structures, and the diffi-
culty of ascertaining present-day tribal title and descendants, the 
ICC was an unsuccessful attempt by Congress to settle claims that 
arose at a time when Indian tribes were recognized as sovereign 
entities by the conquering European culture. 
The ICC required claimants, as an initial matter, to prove that 
they were the successors-in-interest to the aboriginal title in ques-
tion. 210 At this stage the ICC determined whether the Indian group 
was legally entitled to bring their claim.21l The ICC established 
broad group representation standards in order to permit the maxi-
mum number of recoveries. The Court of Claims also interpreted 
these standards broadly. 
Despite the ICC's permissive representation standards, however, 
complete representation of valid claims was limited by a restrictive 
202 I d. at 42. 
2()3Id. 
204 Id. 
2()5 610 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980). 
206 447 F. Supp. at 42. 
207 I d. at 43. 
2()8 610 F.2d at 998. 
209 Id. 
210 1971 Indian Claims Commission 1-2. The second, or valuation, stage determined the 
liability of the government, which was computed by subtracting any previously paid compen-
sation from the value of the acreage in question at the time of extinguishment. I d. In the 
third stage, the ICC offset gratuitous payments by the government against the amount owed. 
Id. 
211 Id. 
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intervention standard. Many Indians no longer live in their ances-
tors' tribal groups since, through forcible or gradual dispersal, tribes 
have splintered into subgroups.212 The ICC's narrow intervention 
policy provided that once a subgroup filed a claim with the ICC on 
behalf of the entire ancestral group, other subgroups that had not 
filed during that period were excluded from representation. 213 N on-
claimant subgroups thus were not permitted to intervene; there were 
no provisions for the possibility that conflicting subgroups may not 
have filed as claimants, either because they believed that the claim 
filed would fairly represent their interests, or because their claims 
were addressed to other branches of the federal government. 214 By 
adhering to a strict group representation standard without a corre-
spondingly lenient intervention policy, the ICC may have violated 
the procedural due process rights of unrepresented individuals. 215 
IV. UNITED STATES V. DANN 
The difficulties inherent in the ICC's permissive representation 
and strict intervention standards that were discussed above, com-
pounded the problems of compensating non-affiliated Indians for 
aboriginal lands taken by the government. The inadequacies of both 
the outmoded definition of aboriginal title rights and the ICC's rep-
resentation standards, culminated in the case of United States v. 
Dann. 216 In Dann, the federal district court in Nevada held that 
aboriginal title was extinguished on the date when the ICC's judg-
ment became final, which was more than a century after the date of 
extinguishment used by the ICC to value the claim. 217 The court's 
decision in Dann presented a welter of overlapping legal, moral, and 
constitutional issues that plagued ICC proceedings since 1946. The 
history of the case itself is a tangled web of litigation. 
A. The Western Shoshone Claim 
The Western Shoshone Indians were a tribe comprised of smaller 
groups or bands who occupied territories in the present-day states 
212 Weatherhead, What is an Indian Tribe? - The Question of Tribal Existence, 8 AM. 
IND. L. REV. 1, 43 (1980) ("the social fact of assimilation - intermarriage, loss of tribal 
custom, adoption of Western life-styles, 'checkerboarding' of reservations"). 
2l:l See supra notes 178-82, 196-210 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra notes 190-92, 203 and accompanying text. 
215 See infra notes 292-323 and accompanying text. 
216 Civil No. R-74-60 (Apr. 25, 1980), rev'd, 706 F.2d 919, 926 (1983), cert. granted, 52 
U.S.L.W. 3763 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984), rev'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4169, 4171 (U.S. Feb. 20,1985). 
217 706 F.2d at 923. 
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of Nevada and California. 218 Some groups of Western Shoshone In-
dians have continuously asserted that there has been no government 
action to extinguish their aboriginal title. 219 A year after the ICC 
was created, the Temoak band of the Western Shoshone Indians 
initiated the claims procedure by approving a claims attorney con-
tract. 220 The contract was also approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior, as required by ICC regulations. 221 The Temoak band's at-
torney filed a claim with the ICC in 1951, seeking compensation for 
confiscated lands on behalf of the Western Shoshone tribe. 222 Their 
complaint alleged that "from time to time," the federal government 
had extinguished the Western Shoshone's aboriginal title by confis-
cation. 223 The Temoak band council did not object to the characteri-
zation of the claim as one for compensation for extinguished title 
because its attorney repeatedly assured the council that the ICC 
proceeding would have no effect on present Western Shoshone title 
or possessory rights.224 In 1962, the ICC found that the Western 
Shoshone tribe had held aboriginal title to a total of 24,396,403 acres 
in Nevada, and that their title to most of this land was extinguished 
over an unspecified period of time by gradual encroachment of both 
the federal government and third parties. 225 Four years later, the 
Temoak claimants, and the government, agreed to stipUlate an av-
erage extinguishment date in order to determine the amount of 
compensation due. The ICC approved the agreed upon date. 226 
218 Steward, The Foundations of Basin-Plateau Shoshonean Society, in LANGUAGES AND 
CULTURES OF WESTERN NORTH AMERICA 113 (E. Swanson ed. 1970). 
219 See, e.g., Western Shoshone Legal Defense & Educ. Ass'n v. United States, 531 F.2d 
495, 499 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976) (unsuccessful attempt to intervene 
in ICC proceedings to remove certain lands from pending claim); Temoak Band ofW. Shoshone 
Indians v. United States, 593 F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979) 
(unsuccessful attempt to stay ICC award). 
220 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. 
221 [d. 
222 Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 11 I.C.C. 87 (1962). 
223 [d. 
224 Transcript, Oral Argument, Temoak Band of W. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 
I.C.C. Docket No. 326-K, at 21, 25-26 (Nov. 14, 1974). The claims attorney for the Temoak 
band stated: 
I've met with the Indians many times to determine these problems and have sought 
guidance. And the question has been raised, well, we want our land. We don't want 
termination .... This litigation means we are selling our land. And the answer is 
very simple. You are not selling your land. Anything that has been taken has been 
taken. This lawsuit is for compensation. It doesn't change your title one bit. 
[d. at 2l. 
225 Shoshone Tribe, 11 I.C.C. at 413-14,416. 
226 Temoak Band, 593 F.2d at 996. 
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The Temoak band council allowed its claims attorney contract to 
expire in 1968.227 The attorney continued to represent the Temoak 
claim before the ICC, however, by consulting with a group of Temoak 
Indians who called themselves the "Western Shoshone Claims Com-
mission," even though the Temoak band council was named as both 
the official representative of the Western Shoshone identifiable 
group, and as the client in the approved claims attorney contract. 228 
During this period, the Dann band of Western Shoshone still lived 
on several of the 24,000,000 acres involved in the Temoak's claim. 
The Western Shoshone Legal Defense and Education Association, 
with which the Dann band was affiliated, attempted to intervene in 
the ICC proceedings.229 The Association argued that any lands to 
which it claimed aboriginal title should be excluded from the deter-
mination of the final award. The ICC denied their motion to inter-
vene on the ground that the issue of title extinguishment had been 
decided in an earlier ruling. 230 The Court of Claims affirmed.231 The 
court held that in light of the lateness of the Association's motion, 
the petitioners failed to make a showing sufficient to require their 
participation in the ICC proceedings. 232 The court distinguished the 
Turile M ountain233 decision on the basis that both subgroups in that 
case had participated in the ICC proceeding from the beginning. 234 
The Association's petition for certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court was denied. 235 
227 [d. at 997. 
228 [d. 
229 Western Shoshone Legal Defense & Educ. Ass'n v. United States, 531 F.2d at 497 (Ct. 
C!. 1976). 
230 35 I. C. C. 457 (1955). 
231 Western Shoshone Legal Defense & Educ. Ass'n, 531 F.2d at 497. 
232 [d. at 503 ("The hour is very late and the showing is not strong."). 
233 490 F.2d 935 (Ct. C!. 1974); see supra notes 147--58 and accompanying text. 
234 531 F.2d at 504 n·.18. 
235 419 U.S. 855 (1976). The litigation did not end there. In support of the Association, the 
Temoak claimants obtained new counsel and filed new pleadings that adopted the Association's 
position. The reformulated claim asserted that aboriginal title to the lands in question had 
never been extinguished. Temoak Band, 593 F.2d at 997. The new pleadings also asserted 
that the Temoak band's previous attorney had not presented them with the choice of whether 
to include all ancestral lands in the claim, or to assert that title to a portion of the land was 
not extinguished. [d. The Temoaks' new attorney filed a motion to stay the ICC proceedings, 
pending a determination by the Department of the Interior on their newly endorsed title 
claim. The ICC denied the stay, however, and entered a final judgment. 40 I.C.C. 305 (1977). 
The Court of Claims affirmed the ICC's ruling on appeal, reasoning that it was too late for 
the claimants to reverse their litigation strategy. 593 F.2d at 996. The court suggested that 
the Temoak claimants could petition Congress for relief from the ICC's final judgment. [d. at 
999. 
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B. United States Government Claim Against the Dann Band 
The claims in United States v. Dann236 were entirely separate 
from ICC proceedings involving the Western Shoshone claim. The 
federal government filed suit against the Dann band in district court 
in 1974, alleging that the Dann band was grazing its livestock on 
public land without a permit. 237 The Danns asserted that the grazing 
lands were not public, but were lands to which they held unextin-
guished aboriginal title.238 Summary judgment was granted for the 
government, on the grounds that the Danns were collaterally es-
topped by the ICC's 1962 decision that the United States had ac-
quired all twenty-two million acres of Western Shoshone land. 239 
In United States v. Dann (Dann 1),240 the Ninth Circuit reversed. 
The court held that collateral estoppel did not preclude litigation of 
the issue of extinguishment of aboriginal title because that issue had 
not been actually litigated before the ICC.241 Neither res judicata 
nor collateral estoppel applied because the ICC's award had not yet 
been paid to the Western Shoshone.242 
On remand, the district court ignored the appellate court's decision 
and enjoined the Dann band from grazing their livestock on the lands 
in question.243 The court reasoned that its final judgment for the 
Western Shoshone rendered the award final for purposes of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel,244 The Western Shoshone's aborigi-
nal title was held to be extinguished on the date the award was 
certified. 245 
In United States v. Dann (Dann II),246 the Ninth Circuit again 
reversed the district court's holding.247 Relying on its holding in 
Dann 1,248 the Ninth Circuit reiterated that the Dann band was not 
collaterally estopped from raising aboriginal title as a defense in the 
present proceedings because the issue of extinguishment of title was 
not actually litigated before the ICC.249 The court also held that the 
286 53 U.S.L.W. 4169 (u.s. Feb. 20, 1985). 
287 Dann [,572 F.2d at 223. 
288 [d. 
289 [d. at 223. 
240 572 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978). 
241 [d. at 226. 
242 [d. 
243 Dann II, 706 F.2d at 923. 
244 [d. 
246 [d. 
246 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983). 
247 [d. 
248 See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text. 
249 706 F.2d at 924. The court also denied that the ICC's decision had any res judicata effect 
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Western Shoshone's aboriginal title had never been extinguished. 250 
Title had not been extinguished by prior application of public land 
laws or by creation of a Western Shoshone reservation because these 
actions did not evince a clear indication of congressional intent to 
extinguish aboriginal title. 251 Furthermore, despite the statutorily 
mandated finality of its judgment, the ICC itself did not have the 
authority to extinguish aboriginal title. 252 
1. The Supreme Court's Decision 
When the United States Supreme Court granted the ICC's peti-
tion for certiorari,253 the question before the Court was whether one 
group of Indians could assert in collateral litigation that aboriginal 
title was not extinguished, despite the entry by the ICC of a final 
judgment to compensate them for extinguishment of that title, when 
the judgment fund had not yet been distributed. 254 The resolution of 
this legal issue would decide the underlying question of whether an 
ICC decision may extinguish aboriginal title. 
The government's primary claim was that a provision of the Indian 
Claims Commission Act255 barred the Danns' assertion of any re-
tained interest in the lands covered by the judgment.256 The govern-
ment presented three supporting arguments. First, since the ICC's 
judgment fund is in trust for all descendants of the Western Shosh-
one tribe, the government has paid the claim under the Act. Actual 
distribution of the funds to individual Western Shoshone descendants 
was not necessary to constitute payment under the Act because the 
claim at issue was tribal, not individual. 257 
under the statutory provision that states that payment of any claim decided by the ICC would 
discharge the United States from any further claims. [d. See also 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976). 
Only congressional approval of the award distribution plan constitutes payment within the 
meaning of the Act. 706 F.2d at 925-26. The court thus distinguished Six Nations Confederacy, 
because in that case Congress had already approved a plan for distribution of the award. [d. 
at 927 n.6; see supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text. 
250 706 F.2d at 928. 
251 [d. at 929-31. 
252 [d. at 928. 
253 52 U.S.L.W. 3763 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984). 
254 [d. 
255 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976). 
256 Brief for the United States at 22, United States v. Dann, 53 U.S.L.W. 4169 (U.S. Feb. 
20, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the United States]. The government cited a provision 
of the Act which reads: 
The payment of any claim, after its determination in accordance with this [Act], shall 
be a full discharge of the United States of all claims and demands touching any of 
the matters involved in the controversy. 
25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976), cited in Brief for the United States, supra, at 2. 
257 Brief for the United States, supra note 256, at 26. 
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Second, the government relied on the language, legislative history, 
and purpose of the Act to show that Congress intended appropriation 
of the judgment fund to constitute final payment. 258 The government 
asserted that the legislative history of the Act indicated that by 
creating the ICC, Congress intended to delegate final responsibility 
for Indian claims against the government to the ICC, and did not 
intend to retain any authority over the finality of claims determined 
by the ICC.259 
Finally, the government argued that the claimants could have 
appealed to Congress at any time during the claims process. 260 The 
Court's duty was to apply the Act as written, and then to wait for 
Congress to decide whether to address particular claims in future 
legislative action. 261 
In response, the Danns presented three arguments to support 
their claim that aboriginal title in the land on which they live was 
not precluded, regardless of whether the ICC judgment was paid. 
First, the Danns asserted that the language of the Act did not 
support the government's attempt to seek, in effect, a federal court 
order to take Indian lands for the first time. 262 This argument pre-
sumed that aboriginal title to the land which the Dann band contin-
ued to occupy had not yet been extinguished, even though the ICC 
judgment in part compensated for the extinguishment of their ti-
tle. 263 The Danns relied on the decision in Osceola v. Kuykendall264 
258 [d. at 30-31. 
259 [d. at 33. The government also argued that subsequent legislation that authorized au-
tomatic appropriation and distribution of judgment funds further evidenced Congress' intent 
to eschew any final veto over the resolution of a claim before the ICC. [d. at 44. The 
government contended that by requiring in 1965 congressional authorization of distribution 
plans recommended by the Secretary of the Interior, Department of the Interior & Related 
Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 88-356, 78 Stat. 276 (1965), Congress intended only 
to oversee the Secretary's performance of his fiduciary duty to manage tribal property. Brief 
for the United States, supra note 256, at 40. In 1973, the Distribution of Judgment Funds 
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1408 (1983 & Supp. 1985), removed this requirement because Congress 
recognized that the 1965 authorization requirement created too heavy a legislative burden. 
Brief for the United States, supra note 256, at 41. Congress amended other existing statutes 
in 1977 and 1978 in order to eliminate legislative authorization of appropriation of funds. [d. 
at 44. 
260 [d. at 46-47. 
261 [d. 
262 Brief for the Danns, supra note 18, at 25-26. 
263 [d. at 26-27. This argument reasoned further that the Danns' assertion of unextinguished 
aboriginal title in the present case was not a claim or demand discharged by operation of the 
Act, but merely a defense. [d. at 27. 
264 4 INDIAN L. REP. F-80 (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) (Mar. 11, 1977), cited 
in Brief for the Danns, supra note 18, at 28. In Osceola, the traditional Seminole Indians in 
possession of aboriginal lands in the Everglades brought an action to restrain the ICC from 
processing a claim, brought by reservation Seminoles, for the extinguishment of all Seminole 
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to argue that the ICC judgment for the Western Shoshone did not 
affect the Danns' present possession of aboriginal title, and that 
therefore the Danns should have had the opportunity to prove pres-
ent possession of aboriginal title as a defense in this action. 265 
The Danns' second argument was a constitutional one. The Danns 
claimed that to bind them to the ICC's decision as to the Western 
Shoshone claim deprived them of due process because they were not 
adequately represented by the Western Shoshone band. 266 Due pro-
cess required verification that the representative claimant ade-
quately represented the affected parties. 267 In the Western Shoshone 
claim before the ICC, however, the Danns asserted that the Temoak 
band, which sought compensation for extinguished aboriginal title, 
did not adequately represent those Western Shoshone who, like the 
Danns, would claim that the tribe's aboriginal title was not extin-
guished. 268 
Finally, the Danns asserted their individual rights of use and 
occupancy that survived abandonment by the Western Shoshone 
tribe. 269 The Danns relied on Cramer v. United States,270 where the 
Court held that individual Indian occupancy is entitled to the same 
protection as tribal rights of occupancy.271 Furthermore, the Court 
in United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Rail Road Company272 held 
that any individual rights of occupancy such as those recognized in 
Cramer would not be affected by a finding that a tribe had relin-
quished its tribal claim to land. 273 
In the alternative, the Danns resorted to the claim that had been 
unsuccessful below: even if the ICC judgment for the tribe precluded 
the Danns' defense of aboriginal title, it did not discharge their claim 
because there has been no payment of the ICC's award within the 
meaning of the Act.274 
aboriginal title in Florida. Brief for the Danns, supra note 18, at 28. The district court in 
Osceola dismissed the traditional Seminoles' complaint, reasoning was that the traditional 
Seminoles had asserted aboriginal title, which confers the right of possession; that the tradi-
tional Seminoles were currently in possession of the lands in question; and that the government 
did not contest their possession. Id. 
265Id. at 27. 
266 I d. at 29. 
267Id. at 30. 
268 I d. at 32-33. 
269Id. at 33. 
270 261 U.S. 219 (1923). See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
271Id. at 227. 
272 314 U.S. 339 (1941). See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. 
273Id. at 357-58 n.23. 
274 Brief for the Danns, supra note 18, at 38. The Danns asserted first that an existing 
statute, 25 U.S.C. § 118 (1983), implicitly defined payment to Indians as final distribution 
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The Danns' arguments failed to sway the Court. In a unanimous 
decision authored by Justice Brennan, the Court held that the cer-
tification and appropriation of the ICC's award to a trust fund held 
for the benefit of the Western Shoshone tribe, constituted "payment" 
under the Act, and thus discharged all claims and demands involving 
the Western Shoshone land claim. 275 The Court looked to the legis-
lative purposes behind the Act and concluded that Congress intended 
to dispose of all Indian claims with finality.276 Congress drafted the 
Act so that when the ICC filed a report with Congress determining 
that a claimant is entitled to recover, that report had "the effect of 
a final judgment,"277 and this payment of a claim would fully dis-
charge the United States from further claims and demands involving 
any matter resolved by the ICC.278 Congress intended to relieve its 
own burden of responding to particularized Indian petitions with 
special jurisdictional acts. 279 Before the statute was enacted, Con-
gress debated whether to delete the finality language in the Act, so 
that Congress would have final authority over claims brought before 
the ICC.280 This suggestion was ultimately discarded. 281 The Court 
reasoned, therefore, that the lower court's justification for making 
payment contingent on Congress' approval of a final distribution 
plan, which was to give Congress a final opportunity to review ICC 
claims on the merits, conflicted with the congressional purpose of 
alleviating its burden of enacting special jurisdictional statutes. 282 
The Court further reasoned that the definition of "payment" ap-
plied by the Ninth Circuit conflicted with the common law usage of 
from the trust, not appropriation to the trust. Brief for the Danns, supra note 18, at 39. 
Second, the Danns argued that the Distribution of Judgment Funds Act provided the Indian 
claimants in an ICC proceeding with two ways to delay or halt payment after appropriation 
to the trust. [d. at 40. In the present case a significant number of Western Shoshone people 
resisted acceptance of a money judgment, causing the Department of the Interior to postpone 
distribution. [d. As a result, Congress must now pass legislation specifically authorizing a 
distribution plan for the ICC judgment. [d. Statements by members of Congress indicated 
that they thought the outcome of the Dann case would have a strong bearing on any action 
Congress might take to authorize a distribution plan for the Western Shoshone award. [d. at 
40-41. Congress had deliberately postponed any action which would affect the final payment. 
[d. at 41. The Danns argued that by exercising this "pocket veto," Congress prevented the 
ICC judgment from precluding their present assertion of aboriginal title. [d. at 46-47. 
275 United States v. Dann, 53 U.S.L.W. 4169,4171 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1985). 
276 [d. 
277 [d. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 22a (1983)). 
278 53 U.S.L.W. at 4171. 
279 [d. 
280 [d. (quoting 92 CONGo REC. 5311 (1946)). 
281 53 U.S.L.W. at 4172 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2693, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1946». 
282 53 U.S.L.W. at 4172. 
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the word, in which payment may be satisfied if the funds are trans-
ferred to a trustee or agent of the creditor. 283 The Court concluded 
that, in accordance with a previous case involving payment between 
the government and Indians,284 the common law definition of "pay-
ment" should apply when interpreting the Act.285 In the Dann case, 
then, the government, as debtor, paid the ICC judgment to the 
government as trustee for the Western Shoshone beneficiaries. 286 
Thus, payment within the context of the Act had occurred, fully 
discharging the United States of all claims relating to Western 
Shoshone title. 287 
The Court refused to address the Danns' claim of individual ab-
original title rights, as supported by the precedent in Cramer, 288 
because that issue had not been addressed by the lower courts. 289 
The Court then remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit. 290 
2. Analysis of U.S. v. Dann: Due Process Implications 
When the Court framed the issue in Dann as whether "payment" 
had been made within the terms of the Act, it circumvented the 
constitutional issue regarding the ICC's procedures. 291 The due pro-
283 Id. 
284 Id. (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942)). 
285 I d. at 4172. 
286Id. 
287 I d. at 4171. 
288 See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
289 Id. 
290Id. In turn, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further pro-
ceedings concerning the Danns' assertion that they held unextinguished individual aboriginal 
title. United States v. Dann, 763 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 269-73 and 
accompanying text. 
291 See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text. Refusal to address the constitutional 
issue may be traced to a traditional judicial reluctance to set aside an agency action when it 
does not violate the terms of the agency's statute. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.N. YOUNG, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 557 (1983). For example, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court reversed a lower 
court's erroneous invalidation of an agency's rule. Id. at 525. The Court explained: 
[a]gencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their 
discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies 
have not chosen to grant them. This is not to say necessarily that there are no 
circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency action because 
of a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by the statute. But such 
circumstances, if they exist, are extremely rare. 
Id. at 524. The Court goes on to describe those rare circumstances as "constitutional con-
straints or extremely compelling circumstances." Id. at 543. Despite the Court's specific 
holding in Dann, because the Danns face both constitutional constraints and extremely com-
pelling circumstances, they should be permitted to assert unextinguished aboriginal title as a 
defense against the government's claim. 
274 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:241 
cess clause of the fifth amendment provides that: "[n]o person shall 
... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... "292 In Indian claims cases, the Indians who claimed their 
aboriginal title was not extinguished suffered a deprivation of this 
constitutionally protected right. Such deprivations resulted because 
often their claims were not even heard by the ICC. The tribal nature 
of aboriginal title,293 and the ICC's permissive claimant standards 
combined with their restrictive intervenor standards,294 were to 
blame for this situation. Thus, one of Congress' purposes in passing 
the Act - to grant Indians the procedural due process they had 
been denied - was frustrated by the inadequacy of the ICC's forum. 
In its report, the House Committee on Indian Affairs expressed 
concern that "Indians have been denied free and equal access to the 
courts, "295 and then reiterated that the Act was "primarily designed 
to right a continuing wrong to our Indian citizens for which no 
possible justification can be asserted."296 Thus, when it stressed the 
two other congressional purposes for the ICC, the Court in Dann297 
overlooked the ICC's most significant purpose: to grant Indians the 
procedural due process they had been denied since they had been 
granted citizenship. 
In recognition of the collective nature of aboriginal title, 298 Con-
gress provided that the ICC would establish very loose requirements 
for claimants to bring what in essence were class actions. 299 A claim 
for extinguished aboriginal title before the ICC shared many of the 
characteristics of a class action suit.300 And, as does the judgment in 
a class action suit, the ICC's decision in an Indian claim bound all 
members of the class. 301 A claimant before the ICC, like the com-
plainant in a class action, held himself out "as representing the legal 
rights of absent parties. "302 If the claimant lost, the absent, but 
represented, parties lost rights that they never personally as-
292 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
293 See supra notes 24-83 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra notes 137-215 and accompanying text. 
295 House Committee on Indian Affairs, supra note 119, at 1349; see supra notes 120-21 and 
accompanying text. 
296 Id. at 1347. 
297 53 U.S.L.W. 4169 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1985). 
298 See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
300 See Butzel, Intervention and Class Actions Before the Agencies and the Courts, 23 AD. 
L. REV. 135, 145 (1973) (description of theoretical underpinnings of class action suits). 
301 See id. 
302Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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serted. 303 Courts have been reluctant to entertain class actions on a 
broad scale because of the potential for wrongfully binding unrepre-
sented claimants to a judgment.304 Congress, apparently unaware 
that the same considerations existed in Indian claim actions, created 
a forum which heard claims that were exclusively class actions, in 
form, if not in name. 
The Court of Claims addressed this class action analogy in Western 
Shoshone Legal Defense and Educational Association v. United 
States:305 "[a]n Indian claim under the Act is unlike a class suit in 
that there is no necessity that the position of each individual member 
of the group be represented; it is only the group claim which need 
be put forward."306 In so concluding, the court failed to recognize 
that constitutional due process necessitates such complete represen-
tation. To insist upon enforcing a class action type of judgment upon 
all reputed memb~rs of the class, even when those members' inter-
ests are in conflict, would result in a violation of procedural due 
process comparable in nature to the violation disallowed in the land-
mark case of Hansberry v. Lee. 307 
In Hansberry, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from 
violating an agreement restricting the use of both parties' land in 
Chicago.308 The Illinois Supreme Court held that, although the stip-
ulation proved false, the defendants were bound by the previous 
judgment because they were members of the class of landowners 
represented in the earlier suit. 309 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, and held that the 
defendants had been deprived of their constitutionally-protected pro-
cedural due process. 310 The Court reasoned that the several land-
owning parties purportedly bound by the earlier decision did not 
constitute a class because the individual members had conflicting 
303 [d. 
304 [d. 
305 531 F.2d 495 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cen. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976). 
306 531 F.2d at 504. 
307 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
308 [d. at 37. When defendants countered that the agreement, which disallowed the use of 
the land by blacks, was invalid because it had not been signed by the requisite percentage of 
landowners, the plaintiff countered by citing an earlier case as the final determination re-
garding the agreement's validity. [d. at 38 (citing Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934». 
Burke was also a suit to enjoin the violation of a restrictive covenant, in which the class of 
landowners had been represented by the litigants, and the parties had stipulated that the 
agreement was valid. [d. 
309 [d. at 39-40. 
310 [d. at 44. 
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interests. 311 The Court refused to permit those members of the 
landowners' group who sought to enforce the agreement to represent 
the members who later sought to dispute the validity of the agree-
ment.312 Similarly, to allow the Temoak band in the Dann313 case to 
represent all the descendants of the Western Shoshone ancestral 
group did not afford protection to the Dann band adequate to satisfy 
the constitutional requirements of due process. The Temoak band 
had an interest in pursuing the ICC claim and thus receiving a 
substantial monetary compensation.314 The Dann band, however, had 
a confiicting interest in maintaining their ranch;315 and as in Hans-
berry,316 this canfiicting interest was not adequately represented. 
Even if the Temoak and Dann bands had substantially the same 
interests regarding the outcome of the claim before the ICC, the 
Temoak band, as an entity separately organized from the Dann band, 
could not adequately represent the Dann band. In McGhee v. Creek 
Nation,317 the Court of Claims refused to permit an organized entity 
of the ancestral Creek Nation to represent all Creek Indians. 318 Even 
though the organized body was recognized by the Department of the 
Interior, and it had authority to represent all the members of that 
body, it did not have the necessary authority to represent the un-
organized Eastern Creeks. 319 Therefore, the Court ruled that the 
Eastern Creeks were "entitled to be represented separately by rep-
resentatives of their own choosing."32o 
This same reasoning is applicable to the claims in the Dann case. 
There are two distinctly organized bodies, and the Temoak band had 
no authority to represent the Dann band before the ICC. The De-
partment of the Interior's recognition of the Temoak band321 merely 
311 Id. 
312 I d. The Court held that the "selection of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose 
substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are 
deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties which due process 
requires." Id. at 45. 
313 53 U.S.L.W. 4169 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1985). 
314 See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text. 
315 See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text. 
316 311 U.S. 321 (1940); see supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text. 
317 122 Ct. Cl. 380 (1952); see supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text. 
318 122 Ct. Cl. at 394. 
319 I d. ("The Creek Nation in Oklahoma has only been recognized by the Secretary of Interior 
as having authority to represent the Creek Indians in Oklahoma. It has never been recognized 
as having authority to represent the unorganized but identifiable group of Creeks east of the 
Mississippi, and therefore is not entitled under the Indian Claims Commission Act to the 
exclusive right of representing such Eastern Creeks.") 
320 Id. at 394-95. 
321 See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text. 
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authorized that band to represent its own membership. Thus, the 
Danns' constitutional argument before the Court, that the ICC did 
not adequately verify that the Temoak band represented all the 
interested parties, should have succeeded. 322 Neither the common 
law doctrine of aboriginal title, nor the statutorily-created ICC, were 
adequate to protect procedural due process for all tribal descendants 
eligible to participate in aboriginal title claims before the ICC. 
3. Alternative Remedies 
As a result of the Court's decision in United States v. Dann, 323 
Indians like the Danns, who continue to live on aboriginal title land, 
are estopped from proving in collateral litigation that title is not 
extinguished when a prior ICC judgment allegedly compensated 
them for their land. Indians in the Danns' position, however, may 
pursue several alternatives to obtain relief from the ICC judgment. 
The two best alternatives involve petitioning to Congress for sta-
tutory relief, or seeking appellate review of the ICC's decision by 
the Court of Claims. 
The Danns could petition Congress to enact a statute providing 
for review by the Claims Court as to the issue whether extinguish-
ment could be stipulated before the ICC. Such a statute would have 
to disregard the principles of res judicata. Congress enacted a similar 
statute in 1978, which authorized the Court of Claims to review the 
merits of the Sioux Indians' Black Hills claim. 324 Such a statute would 
322 Another procedural due process violation could be charged against the ICC's statute 
itself. The Act denied parties whose rights were affected the opportunity to protect their 
interests, by delegating unconstitutional authority to the Secretary of Interior to determine 
who may appear before the ICC. 
323 See supra notes 275-90 and accompanying text. 
324 25 U.S.C. § 70s (b) (1976). That statute, which amended the Indian Claims Commission 
Act, states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon application by the claimants within 
thirty days from March 13, 1978, the Court of Claims shall review on the merits, 
without regard to the defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel, that portion of 
the determination of the Indian Claims Commission entered February 15, 1974, 
adjudging that the Act of February 28, 1877 (19 Stat. 254), effected a taking of the 
Black Hills portion of the Great Sioux Reservation in violation of the fifth amendment, 
and shall enter judgment accordingly. In conducting such review, the Court shall 
receive and consider any additional evidence, including oral testimony, that either 
party may wish to provide on the issue of' a fifth amendment taking and shall 
determine that issue de novo. 
[d. Pursuant to this statute, the Court of Claims affirmed the ICC's holding that the congres-
sional act of 1877 effected a taking, compensable by the value at the date of taking plus 
interest. Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1159 (Ct. Cl. 1979). In 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 407 (1980), the Court upheld the 
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allow the introduction of additional evidence, and permit the repre-
sentation of all the competing interests involved before the Claims 
Court. In the subsequent review, the Danns could introduce evidence 
refuting the stipulated extinguishment. 
A second possible avenue for alternative relief from an ICC judg-
ment is the filing of a motion to reopen the case in the Claims Court, 
"an independent motion," pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 152(b).325 The Federal Rule provides: 
[t]his rule does not limit the power of the court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, 
or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. 326 
To entertain such an independent action to reconsider a decision, 
the court must have equity jurisdiction, and if there had been no 
previous judgment, must have subject matter jurisdiction.327 
Authority for the filing of such an independent action derives from 
the decision in United States v. Andrade.328 In Andrade, the Court 
of Claims assumed, without deciding, that it had jurisdiction to 
entertain an independent action to reconsider an ICC judgment. 329 
The court reasoned that it possessed the necessary equity jurisdic-
tion to hear an independent action because it has the authority to 
reopen its own judgment. Therefore, since the Indian Claims Com-
mission Act provides that an ICC judgment has the same effect as 
a judgment of the Court of Claims, it should similarly be authorized 
to reopen an ICC judgment.33o The court also ruled that it possessed 
original subject matter jurisdiction over a claim to reopen an ICC 
proceeding because the Act provides that the Court of Claims can 
entertain Indian claims accruing after 1946.331 
The court dismissed the claim in Andrade,332 however, because 
the plaintiffs did not carry their burden of proving that the ICC's 
statute's constitutionality against a charge that it impermissibly violated the doctrine of 
separation of powers. Id. at 407. 
325 FED. R. Crv. P. 152(b). 
326 Id., cited in Andrade v. United States, 485 F.2d 660, 663 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (per curiam), 
cert. denied sub nom Pitt River v. United States, 419 U.S. 831 (1974). 
327 485 F.2d at 663-64. 
328 485 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 
329 I d. at 663. 
33°Id. at 664 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976». 
331 485 F.2d at 664 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982». (Any action which would subject a 
judgment of the ICC to reconsideration must occur, by definition, after the date the ICC was 
founded.) 
332 485 F.2d at 664-65. 
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judgment was manifestly unconscionable - a burden that was heav-
ier because the plaintiffs could have brought suit eight years earlier. 
In a situation like the Danns' case, however, their prior attempts to 
intervene,333 and the due process component334 of their claim, should 
meet this stringent proof requirement and allow their claim to be 
heard. 335 
v. CONCLUSION 
Decisions by the Indian Claims Commission in aboriginal title 
extinguishment cases may have violated the due process rights of 
individual Indians still living on aboriginal lands. However, the 
Court's conflicting pronouncements on the question of the scope of 
333 See supra notes 230--36 and accompanying text. 
334 See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text. 
335 Other available alternatives seem unlikely to succeed. First, disputants could petition 
Congress for an act declaring their aboriginal title unextinguished despite the ICC judgment, 
or for a grant of the same parcel of land to which aboriginal title had been declared extin-
guished. Congressional approval is unlikely, however, because either proposal may violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. Andrade, 485 F.2d at 663. 
Second, the Danns could seek an executive initiative to regain their ancestral land, either 
formally with an executive order, or informally by provoking executive lobbying in Congress. 
Two Indian groups successfully used both these alternatives during the Nixon Administration. 
Note, supra note 23, at 393. In 1972, Nixon signed an executive order providing for the return 
to the Yakima Indians of Mount Adams, a sacred mountain which had been confiscated and 
declared public land. Exec. Order No. 11,670. The Nixon Administration also pushed legis-
lation through Congress to return the Blue Lake shrine to the Taos Pueblo Indians, over the 
objections of the Senate Interior & Insular Affairs Committee. The Administration did not 
set a precedent for the return of aboriginal lands, however, because it stressed that it was 
acting out of respect for Indian religious beliefs. 116 CONGo REC. 23131, 23133 (1970). More 
recent appeals to the executive branch have failed. 1978 Hearings, supra note 181, at 503-15 
(appeals to Vice President and Secretary of Interior). Given such limited past success with 
executive intervention, and more recent failure, an appeal to the current administration seems 
unlikely to succeed. 
Third, Indians disputing an ICC judgment could assert adverse possession as a defense in 
an action brought against them by the government. The Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a 
(1972), which enables citizens to bring suits to quiet title against the government, clearly 
states that sovereign immunity is not waived to permit suits against the government based 
on adverse possession. Id. at § 2409a(g). Despite this limitation, Indians may claim adverse 
possession as a defense in a suit brought by the government, such as the claim against the 
Danns. However, in such a case the requisite adverseness of possession may be disqualified 
by the government's acquiescence in knowingly permitting the Indians to continue occupying 
the land. See also Turtle Mountain Band, 490 F.2d at 942 ("Defendant [government] invokes 
the traditional doctrine that land interests cannot normally be acquired against the sovereign 
by adverse possession or lapse of time. But that very same principle was applied by the 
predecessor sovereigns, and if it were to be allowed to affect Indian title (in the way the 
Government seeks) no aboriginal title could have been obtained at any time after assumption 
of sovereignty on this continent by the first European powers. Of course, this has never been 
the rule for Indian ownership." (citations omitted). 
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individual rights in the area of aboriginal title lands makes this issue 
unclear. Since the Court refused to recognize a violation of the Dann 
band's due process rights in United States v. Dann, individual In-
dians who maintain that their aboriginal title to lands is not yet 
extinguished must pursue other avenues to vindicate their title 
rights. This controversy will continue until the last acre of aboriginal 
title land in the United States is converted into fee simple title. 
